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involving transgender people. It is only
now, in the context of litigation, that
officials of the State suggest otherwise.”
Respecting the question of the
merits, the court’s analysis goes so far
as to assume the Defendants are correct
that rational basis applies and finds
that, even if it did, the Act could not
survive this level of review. Although
not explicit, Judge Trauger’s reasoning
here arguably harkens back to an earlier
and lengthy portion of the opinion
examining Plaintiffs’ submission of a
declaration from an expert on gender
identity, Dr. Shayne Sebold Taylor, M.D.
On this score, Judge Trauger points
to evidence from Dr. Taylor that the
Act might create issues of the sort it
claimed to be trying to address. For
example, a literal reading of the Act’s
required signage would seem to require
a transgender man to use the women’s
restroom and a transgender woman to
use the men’s restroom and the opposite
seems a goal, if only implicit, of the
legislation.
The court easily found for Plaintiffs
on the other three prongs of the analysis.
The opinion recites the oft-cited
principle that “’[t]he loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury.” “The
irreparable harm posed by the Act,
however, does not end with the abstract
question of constitutionality . . . the
[P]laintiffs have presented evidence
that they have strived to be welcoming
spaces for communities that include
transgender individuals and that the
signage required by the Act would
disrupt welcoming environments that
they wish to provide. That harm would
be real, and it is not a harm that could be
simply remedied by some award at the
end of litigation.”
As to the public interest, the court
concludes that there is “ . . . a low
likelihood that the injunctive relief
would intrude on any power legitimately
retained by the State of Tennessee.” The
Defendants had complained that by
enjoining the state from enforcing the
Act it would suffer an irreparable injury
because the Act was passed by duly
elected representatives. Judge Trauger
pointed out, however, that no harm

was, in fact, being done in this regard
because “[n]o legislature can enact a law
it lacks the power to enact.”
In balancing the equities, the court “
. . . [had] little difficulty concluding the
preliminary injunction should issue . .
. ” because without it, Plaintiffs would
be irreparably harmed and requiring
Tennessee to “ . . . abide by the U.S.
Constitution, sooner rather than later,
vindicates the public interest in rule of
law and the acceptance, by States, of
constitutional government.”
The opinion concludes with the
simple order that Defendants “take no
actions to enforce” the Act.
Judge Trauger was appointed by
President Bill Clinton. The ACLU
appeared on Plaintiffs’ behalf by
Emerson Sykes, Esq., Rose Sykes, Esq.
Stella Yarbrough, Esq., and Thomas H.
Castelli, Esq. ■
Matthew Goodwin is an associate at
Brady Klein Weissman LLP in New
York City, specializing in matrimonial
and family law.

Indiana Federal
Court Rejects
Public School
Teacher’s Religious
Discrimination
Claim Over
Misgendering
Discharge
By Arthur S. Leonard
U.S. District Judge Jane MagnusStinson ruled in Kluge v. Brownsburg
Community School Corporation, 2021
WL 2915023, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
129122 (S.D. Ind., July 12, 2021), that
the Brownsburg (Indiana) Community
School Corporation did not violate
music teacher John Kluge’s statutory
rights under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 when it effectively
discharged him for his refusal to
comply with the School’s requirement
that he address transgender students
by their preferred names and pronouns.
Granting summary judgment in favor
of the Corporation, the court rejected
Kluge’s assertion that his proposal to
address all students by last name without
using pronouns was a reasonable
accommodate to his religious beliefs
that the Corporation was obligated to
accept.
The judge had previously dismissed
Kluge’s claims that the School violated
his First Amendment rights of free
exercise of religion and freedom
of speech, but she had denied the
School’s motion to dismiss his Title
VII reasonable accommodation claim
at that time. See Kluge v. Brownsburg
Community School Corporation, 432 F.
Supp. 3d 823 (S.D. Ind., Jan. 8, 2020).
Kluge began working as a music
teacher and orchestra leader at
Brownsburg High School in August
2014, and by all accounts was a
successful and effective teacher – at
least until the issue of transgender
names came up. In 2016, the U.S.
Education Department sent a “Dear
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Colleague” letter to public school
officials advising them of the rights of
transgender students under Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972,
including the right to be addressed
by the students’ preferred first names
and pronouns. This letter was sparked
by Gavin Grimm’s lawsuit against
Gloucester School District in Virginia,
which had adopted a rule barring
the transgender boy from using the
boys’ restrooms at the high school.
The Obama Administration granted a
request by Grimm’s ACLU attorneys to
notify the court of the Administration’s
position on Grimm’s Title IX right and
followed up with the “Dear Colleague”
letter sent nationwide.
The Corporation came to grips with
this issue in the spring of 2017, as some
transgender students were expected to
attend the high school. The Corporation
used a database called PowerSchool
to maintain student records. It
implemented a “Name Policy” to take
effect in May 2017, requiring all staff
to address students by the name that
appeared in the PowerSchool database.
Under the policy, transgender students
could change their first name in the
database by presenting a letter from a
parent and a letter from a health care
professional concerning the need for
a name change consistent with their
gender identity. A change in gender
marker and pronouns on the database
could go along with the name change.
Kluge “identifies as a Christian and
is a member of Clearnote Church, which
is part of the Evangelical Presbytery,”
wrote Judge Magnus-Stinson. As a
“church elder,” he holds leadership
positions in the church and is a worship
group leader. “Mr. Kluge’s religious
beliefs ‘are drawn from the Bible,’ and
his ‘Christian faith governs the way he
thinks about human nature, marriage,
gender, sexuality, morality, politics,
and social issues,’” Kluge stated in a
document filed with the court. “Mr.
Kluge believes that God created
mankind as either male or female,
that this gender is fixed in each person
from the moment of conception, and
that it cannot be changed, regardless
of an individual’s feelings or desires.”
Under his beliefs, he would be sinning
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if he encouraged a student’s gender
dysphoria by calling them by a name
inconsistent with their sex as identified
at birth.
Kluge notified the high school
principal that he could not comply with
the Name Policy, and was told he had
three options: comply, resign, or be
discharged. He proposed a compromise:
that the school accommodate his
religious beliefs by allowing him to
call all students by their last name
and avoid using pronouns. The school
authorities agreed to let him do this,
but at the end of the fall semester, they
told him it wasn’t working and although
they would let him finish out the school
year under that arrangement, he would
be expected in future to comply with
the policy or to resign. Kluge alleged
that he was told that he could submit a
conditional letter of resignation and it
would not be acted upon until the end
of the spring semester, but the letter
that he submitted said nothing about
it being conditional, and at the end of
the semester, as he indicated continued
unwillingness to comply with the Name
Policy, his resignation was accepted. He
contended that this was a constructive
discharge.
Kluge claimed that he had been
discharged for his religious beliefs and
filed suit, claiming violations of the 1st
Amendment (and analogous provisions
of the Indiana Constitution) and Title
VII and parallel state laws.
Judge Magnus-Stinson granted
the School’s motion to dismiss the
constitutional claims in January 2020,
finding that Kluge’s 1st Amendment
rights of free exercise of religion and
freedom of speech were not implicated
in the case. The Name Policy, she found,
was a neutral, generally applicable
policy, and he had no constitutional
right under the religious freedom clause
to refuse to comply with it. Similarly,
she found, the language he was
required to use in addressing students
was not protected political speech of a
private citizen, but rather was speech
incidental to performing his duties as a
public school teacher, and thus subject
to regulation by the School. She also
rejected his argument that the Name
Policy violated the Due Process Clause

on grounds of vagueness, pointing out
that he was not required to make any
judgment or interpretations, but just to
use the names and gender designation
as they appeared in the Corporation’s
database, as clearly specified by the
policy.
But Judge Magnus-Stinson found,
based on the allegations Kluge made
in his complaint, that he had stated
a claim of religious discrimination
(failure
to
accommodate)
and
retaliation under Title VII, so the case
proceeded to discovery. After discovery
was completed, the School moved
for summary judgement, which was
granted on July 12, 2021.
The question under Title VII was
whether the accommodation that
Kluge sought would impose an “undue
hardship” on the School. The judge
decided that it would. “Mr. Kluge’s
religious opposition to transgenderism
is directly at odds with BCSC’s policy of
respect for transgender students, which
is founded in supporting and affirming
those students,” she wrote, finding that
“the undisputed evidence in this case
demonstrates that the last names only
accommodation indeed resulted in
undue hardship to BCSC as that term is
defined by relevant authority.”
Transgender students had filed
declarations with the court showing
that “Mr. Kluge’s use of last names
only – assuming, only for the purposes
of this Order, that Mr. Kluge strictly
complied with the rules of the
accommodation – made them feel
targeted and uncomfortable.” One of
the students stated that they “dreaded
going to orchestra class and did not
feel comfortable speaking to Mr. Kluge
directly. Other students and teachers
complained that Mr. Kluge’s behavior
was insulting or offensive and made his
classroom environment unwelcoming
and uncomfortable.” One transgender
student “quit the orchestra entirely.”
According to news reports (but not
the judge’s opinion), students also
complained that Kluge occasionally
slipped up and misgendered trans
students by using “Mr.” or “Ms.” to
address them.
Thus, the court found, “this evidence
shows that Mr. Kluge’s use of the last

names only accommodation burdened
BSCS’s ability to provide an education
to all students and conflicted with
its philosophy of creating a safe
and supportive environment for all
students.” The court also noted the
possibility that allowing Kluge to
continue with this “accommodation”
might subject the School to liability to
the transgender students under Title IX,
an issued which came into even clearer
focus after the Biden Administration
began in January 2021 by revoking the
Trump Administration’s position that
Title IX does not protect transgender
students, and then issuing a formal
interpretation applying the Supreme
Court’s Bostock decision to the
interpretation of Title IX, as several
federal courts had done during 2020
despite the Trump Administration’s
position to the contrary. In addition, the
7th Circuit was the first federal appeals
court to recognize a transgender high
school student’s right to use facilities
consistent with their gender identity
under Title IX, so the application
of that statute to a gender identity
discrimination claim is a binding
precedent on the Indiana district court.
The judge also rejected Kluge’s
retaliation claim, finding that because
his refusal to comply with the Name
Policy was not a “protected activity”
under Title VII, the School’s discharge
of Kluge for his opposition to the policy
could not be the basis for a retaliation
claim.
Judge Magnus-Stinson noted that
between the time she issued her earlier
order dismissing Kluge’s constitutional
claim and the date of this new decision,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th
Circuit had issued a ruling accepting a
similar constitutional claim by a public
university professor who was disciplined
by the university’s administration for
actually misgendering transgender
students in the classroom, after having
agreed not to do so by adopting
the same procedure that Kluge had
proposed: avoiding using first names
and pronouns in class. Indiana is in the
7th Circuit, so the 6th Circuit’s ruling
was not binding on an Indiana district
court, and that court premised its ruling
solely on the 1st Amendment.

“Interestingly,”
noted
Judge
Magnus-Stinson, “the case upon which
Mr. Kluge so vehemently relies as to
the objective conflict issue, could fairly
be read to support the existence of an
undue hardship” on the Corporation.
“In describing the relevant facts, the
Sixth Circuit called the university’s
suggestion that the professor eliminate
all gendered language ‘a practical
impossibility that would also alter
the pedagogical environment in his
classroom’ and noted that the professor
was of the opinion that ‘eliminating
pronouns altogether was next to
impossible, especially when teaching.’”
Press attention to Judge MagnusStinson’s ruling may attract the attention
of the anti-LGBTQ organizations that
frequently take cases like this one,
such as Alliance Defending Freedom
or Liberty Counsel, which might result
in an appeal to the 7th Circuit. Judge
Magnus-Stinson was appointed by
President Barack Obama in 2010. ■

California Appeals
Court Strikes
Misgendering
Provision from
Patient Bill of
Rights
By Arthur S. Leonard
A three-judge panel of California’s
3rd District Court of Appeal partially
reversed a ruling by Sacramento
County Superior Court Judge Steven
M. Gevercer in Taking Offense v. State
of California, 2021 Cal. App. LEXIS
583, 2021 WL 3013112 (July 16, 2021),
holding that the state violated the 1st
Amendment free speech rights of staff
members in long-term-care facilities
by making it a misdemeanor for such
individuals to repeatedly and knowingly
misgender a resident of such a facility.
At the same time, however, the court
rejected an equal protection challenge
to a provision that protects transgender
residents’ rights to be housed consistent
with their gender identity. Judge Elena
Duarte wrote the opinion for the
appellate panel. Judge Gevercer had
rejected constitutional challenges to
both provisions.
The misgendering provision is part
of California’s LGBT Long-Term-Care
Facility Residents’ Bill of Rights, passed
in 2017 in response to evidence that
LGBT people have suffered significant
discrimination in such facilities. The
plaintiff in this case, an “unincorporated
association which includes at least
one California citizen and taxpayer,”
calls itself “Taking Offence,” and they
“take offence” to the state making such
speech a crime.
The court decided that the
misgendering provision is a contentbased regulation of speech by the
government, which under both the
state and federal constitutions would be
presumptively unconstitutional unless
it met the test of strict scrutiny. Under
that two-part test, the government
must have a compelling interest for
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